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1 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 Amici are professors and scholars who teach and 
write on legal and economic issues and are concerned 
about the role of patent law in promoting technologi-
cal innovation. They are Timothy K. Armstrong, 
James E. Bessen, Michele Boldrin, Irene Calboli, 
Brian W. Carver, Ralph D. Clifford, Wesley M. Cohen, 
Eric Goldman, Brad A. Greenberg, Bronwyn H. Hall, 
Christian Helmers, Karim R. Lakhani, David K. 
Levine, Brian J. Love, Eric S. Maskin, Michael J. 
Meurer, Shawn P. Miller, Connie Davis Nichols, Tyler 
T. Ochoa, Jorge R. Roig, Matthew Sag, F. M. Scherer, 
Jason M. Schultz, Katherine J. Strandberg, Alexan-
der Tabarrok, and Eric von Hippel. Various amici 
have taught, researched, and published analyses on 
the role of patent law as an incentive to inventors and 
entrepreneurs. A summary of the qualifications and 
affiliations of the individual amici is provided at the 
end of this brief, though it should be noted that amici 
file this brief solely as individuals and not on behalf 
of the institutions with which they are affiliated. 
Amici represent neither party in this action and offer 
the following views on this matter.1  
--------------------------------- i ---------------------------------   
 
 1 In accordance with S. Ct. R. 37.3(a), all parties have 
consented to the filing of this brief. The Petitioner and Respon-
dents have filed consent letters with the Clerk. Pursuant to 
S. Ct. R. 37.6, counsel for amici state that no counsel for a party 
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity 
other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution 
to the preparation or submission of this brief. 
2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The Federal Circuit’s expansion of patentable 
subject matter in the 1990s led to a threefold increase 
in software patents, many of which contain abstract 
ideas merely tethered to a general-purpose computer. 
There is little evidence, however, to suggest this 
expansion has produced an increase in software 
innovation. The software industry was highly innova-
tive in the decade immediately prior to this expan-
sion, when the viability of software patentability was 
unclear and software patents were few. When sur-
veyed, most software developers oppose software 
patenting, and, in practice, software innovators tend 
to rely on other tools to capture market share such as 
first-mover advantage, trade secrecy, copyright, 
goodwill, and economic network effects. If anything, 
the increase in software patenting has led to an 
increase in software litigation, which in turn has 
encouraged firms to acquire patents for strategic 
purposes unrelated to innovation, serving as either 
defensive stockpiles to deter legal threats or offensive 
leverage for rent-seeking patent assertion entities 
(PAEs). 
 Moreover, abstract software patents do not func-
tion well within a property rights framework because 
they fail to define cognizable metes and bounds and 
fail to provide effective notice to third parties of when 
a particular practice or product might infringe. Due 
to their abstractness, these claims can often be con-
strued to cover any of the particularized processes 
  
3 
that result in the same outcome, including those 
never envisioned by the inventor. Accordingly, these 
metes and bounds are not concrete enough to be 
useful to those who wish to tread carefully around 
them. The mere application of the idea using general-
purpose technological components, such as a general-
purpose computer, does nothing to abate this prob-
lem. Similarly, abstract patents defy the attempts of 
software innovators, or general counsel at technology 
companies, to stay on notice of what is already pro-
tected. This leaves firms vulnerable to investing in 
software development with little to no assurance that 
they will be able to avoid infringing upon an abstract 
patent, even if they conduct diligent searches within 
patent databases. Again, this will be true even if 
there are general-purpose technological components 
tethered to the claims, as those components do noth-
ing to help distinguish one abstract claim from an-
other. Proliferation of such patents also contributes to 
the problem of patent thickets. 
 A well-defined 35 U.S.C. § 101 ensures that 
abstract software patent claims and their attendant 
notice and patent thicket problems do not under-
mine the patent system and stymie innovation. It 
serves as a decisive gatekeeper that the Patent 
Office and trial courts can use early in administra-
tive proceedings and litigation. Further, it avoids 
many of the systemic challenges prevalent with the 
use of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112 in such cases – 
the speed of software innovation, the difficulty 
  
4 
locating software prior art, and lax, broad claiming 
standards. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the 
invalidity of the patent claims at issue here and hold 
that abstract ideas in the form of software are 
unpatentable and that mere computer implementa-
tion of those ideas does not create patentability. 
--------------------------------- i --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
 The Constitution empowers Congress to create a 
patent system granting exclusive rights to inventors, 
but only as a means of encouraging innovation. See 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This Court’s jurispru-
dence has consistently recognized that extending 
patent protection to abstract ideas not only fails to 
increase innovation overall, but threatens to impede 
its progress. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prome-
theus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) 
(“[M]onopolization of [abstract ideas] through the 
grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation 
more than it would tend to promote it.”); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010). Nonetheless, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
gradually expanded the scope of patentable subject 
matter for abstract ideas over the last quarter centu-
ry, culminating with its holdings in In re Alappat, 33 
F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) and State Street Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). As a result of this misguided 
expansion, the patent system has become increasing-
ly unbalanced and even hostile in some respects to 
5 
high technology entrepreneurs and inventors. This 
case presents the Court with an opportunity to ex-
pand on its efforts in Bilski and Mayo to restore 
balance by reaffirming the abstract idea exclusion as 
a robust gatekeeper that prohibits abstract patent 
claims, such as those asserted in this case, no matter 
the form in which their drafters attempt to claim 
them. Amici present this brief and the empirical 
evidence within it in support of such an opinion. 
 
I. Abstract Software Patents Discourage 
Innovation. 
 In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) as 
well as Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), this 
Court recognized the risks of allowing patents on the 
abstract formulas and concepts contained in software 
even when they were tied tangentially to a physical 
apparatus. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (extending this 
principle by holding that post-solution activity does 
not “transform an unpatentable principle into a 
patentable process,” otherwise any “competent 
draftsman could attach some form of post-solution 
activity to almost any mathematical formula.”); 
Benson, 409 U.S. at 68 (invalidating claims for being 
“so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known 
and unknown uses” of a method of numerical conver-
sion on a general-purpose computer). When this 
Court did find such a patent valid in Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), its holding was limited to 
the application of a formula in a specific industrial 
process. Id. at 192. Unfortunately the Federal Circuit 
6 
misunderstood this delicate analysis and increasingly 
expanded the scope of patentable subject matter, 
culminating with its decisions in Alappat and State 
Street, allowing otherwise abstract patent claims to 
qualify under § 101 based on a mechanical “magic 
words” approach. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375 
(requiring that an abstract software claim merely 
produce a “useful, concrete and tangible result”); 
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545 (holding that a software 
program based on an abstract idea was patentable 
as long as the claim included a general-purpose 
computer). 
 This expansion has contributed to a dramatic 
increase in the number of patents related to software, 
both in absolute terms and as a percentage of issued 
patents. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-
13-465, Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors That 
Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help 
Improve Patent Quality 13 (2013), available at 
http://1.usa.gov/1gatCRr (noting that after Alappat 
and State Street, there was a substantial increase in 
the number of patents granted with software claims). 
The following chart demonstrates this increase: 
7 
 
Id. at 12. Take, for example, the estimated 11,000 
patents covering the sale of goods online. James 
Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How 
Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at 
Risk 213 (2008). These patents emerged, at least 
in part, because otherwise unpatentable abstract 
ideas – e.g., holding desired products in a shopping 
cart, checking out upon shopping completion, press-
ing a button to “buy it now” – became the patentable 
inventions of the first patent applicant to suggest 
  
8 
implementing the idea on a computer. Cf. Alappat, 33 
F.3d at 1545. 
 
A. Abstract Software Patents Should Be 
Limited, as There Is Little Evidence 
that Software Innovators Rely on Pa-
tenting for Incentives to Innovate and 
Compete. 
 Despite the expanded availability of patent 
protection, studies of the software industry have 
failed to show any corresponding increase in innova-
tion as a result. While the number of software pa-
tents has increased, there is evidence that software 
entrepreneurs rely much less on patent incentives 
when building and maintaining competitive busi-
nesses than other factors, such as first mover ad-
vantage and trade secret, copyright, or trademark 
protection. See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High 
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: 
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 Berke-
ley Tech. L.J. 1255, 1288-90 (2009). In fact, studies 
suggest that spending on stronger and broader soft-
ware patents is negatively correlated with spending 
on R&D. See Robert Hunt & James Bessen, The 
Software Patent Experiment, 77(3) Fed. Res. Bank 
Phila. Bus. Rev. 22, 27-29 (2004) (“[T]he negative 
correlation between increases in firms’ focus on 
software patents and their R&D intensity in the 
1990s suggests that firms may be substituting for 
R&D with software patents.”); see also James Bessen 
  
9 
& Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software 
Patents 30-33 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Working 
Paper No. 03-17, 2004) (reporting the results of a 
historical study showing that in the 1990s firms 
increased their propensity to patent after subject 
matter restrictions on software patents were relaxed, 
and that this increase in spending on patents dis-
placed spending on R&D to such an extent that, 
assuming perfect substitution, R&D would have been 
about 10%, or $16 billion, higher if there had been no 
increase in software patenting). 
 History also suggests that patent incentives have 
had a negligible impact on software development 
overall. Despite the denial of software patentability 
in Benson and Flook, which rejected broad-based 
abstract claims, or after Diehr, which only allowed 
patentability involving software in a very narrow 
concrete context, software innovation flourished in 
the period between Benson and Alappat. See Martin 
Campbell-Kelly, From Airline Reservations to Sonic 
the Hedgehog: A History of the Software Industry 18-
19 tbl.1.2 (2003) (noting that the software industry 
grew eightfold between 1980 and 1990, with revenues 
increasing from $6.1 billion to $51.3 billion). In 
addition, surveys of software developers during this 
period show most were, in fact, opposed to patents. 
See, e.g., Effy Oz, Acceptable Protection of Software 
Intellectual Property: A Survey of Software Developers 
and Lawyers, 34 Info. & Mgmt. 161, 167-70 (1998); 
Pamela Samuelson et al., Developments on the Intel-
lectual Property Front, 35(6) Comms. of the ACM 33, 
10 
35 (1992); Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra, at 
189 (“[S]uch broad opposition from within the affected 
industry and among the affected inventors seems to 
be unprecedented in U.S. patent history.”). And, 
despite the fact that software patents have been 
growing both in absolute terms and as a percentage of 
all patents granted in recent decades, most software 
firms still do not patent their software products. 
James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, 18 
B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 241, 255 (2012). This appears 
to be even more true for startup firms. Id. at 255-56. 
 Indeed, practically speaking, it is unlikely that 
patent rights can spur innovation in software be-
cause: 
[I]nnovation in the high-tech industry is ex-
ceedingly fast, while government bureaucra-
cy is exceedingly slow. Computing power 
doubles roughly every two years, but it gen-
erally takes three to four years to receive a 
patent, and even longer to enforce it in court. 
As a result, patented inventions in the high-
tech sector are invariably yesterday’s news. 
Brian J. Love, No: Software Patents Don’t Spur 
Innovation, but Impede It, Wall St. J., May 12, 2013, 
at R2. 
   
11 
B. The Need for Socially Wasteful Defen-
sive Bulwarks Has Primarily Driven 
Software Patenting Since Alappat and 
State Street, Rather than the Desire to 
Protect Investments in R&D or to 
Promote Competition. 
 While there is little evidence that expanded 
software patent eligibility has spurred innovation, it 
is increasingly apparent that it has spurred patent 
litigation. See Bessen, supra, at 261 (“[T]he number of 
lawsuits involving software patents has more than 
tripled since 1999.”); Bessen & Meurer, Patent Fail-
ure, supra, at 193 (“Software patents issued in more 
recent years are much more likely to be litigated, not 
less.”). This increase is not merely in proportion to 
the growing number of software patents; the probabil-
ity that any single software patent will result in 
litigation has also been rising over time, meaning 
that both defendants and software patentees face a 
higher risk of litigation and business uncertainty. The 
following chart demonstrates this:  
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Probability that a Patent Is in Lawsuit Within 
Four Years of Issue 
Note: Data adjusted for under-reporting. 
Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra, at 193, 
fig.9.2. The increase in software patent litigation is 
such that the GAO reports that the increase in over-
all patent litigation is largely attributable to the 
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growth of litigation over software patents. U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, supra, at 14. 
 Ironically the increase in litigation has led many 
operating software companies to obtain patents to 
fend off suits, rather than to file them. See Colleen V. 
Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex 
Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent 
System, 62 Hastings L.J. 297, 306-10 (2010) (describ-
ing the practice of defensive patenting by high-tech 
firms as growing rapidly after the late 1990s); Jona-
than Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 
2 J. Legal Analysis 687, 704-14 (2010) (explaining 
how patents with high private value – defined as the 
value of a patent as a tool for initiating or deterring 
litigation – often fail to generate socially beneficial 
research); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, 
Patent Portfolios, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 26 (2005) 
(discussing how patents can be more valuable to 
companies in aggregate as a defensive portfolio than 
individually as reward mechanisms). In this context, 
patents no longer function to reward innovation: 
they are merely an added cost of doing business, an 
insurance policy against litigation as opposed to a 
reward for productive R&D. For larger firms this 
practice of amassing stockpiles of broad patents has 
amounted to a Cold War-era arms race that produces 
costly deterrence through an implied threat of mu-
tually assured destruction by litigation. See general-
ly Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The 
Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for 
the Patent System, supra, at 333-34; Colleen V. Chien, 
14 
Race to the Bottom, 51 Intell. Asset Mgmt. Mag. 10 
(2012). The costs of this practice are incurred on 
multiple levels: first, the cost to the firm and its 
shareholders of acquiring the defensive patent; 
second, the cost of defending against a software 
patent lawsuit; and third, the cost to society that 
occurs when innovation is chilled or firms are de-
terred from entering a market. Some large technology 
companies have devoted billions of dollars to building 
their patent portfolios, spending more on strategic 
patent acquisitions and litigation than on overall 
R&D. See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, 
Used as a Sword, N.Y. Times (Feb. 25, 8:14 PM), 
http://nyti.ms/N0Ba0T; see also Steven Church, Tim 
Culpan & Devin Banerjee, Apple Joins Microsoft, 
RIM in $4.5 Billion Buy of Nortel Patents, Bloomberg 
(July 1, 2011, 12:18 PM), http://bloom.bg/1aLJegC; 
James Kendrick, Google Buys Motorola Mobility and 
Its Patent Portfolio for $12.5 Billion, ZDNet (Aug. 15, 
2011 5:27 PM), http://zd.net/1iE21KY. 
 
C. The Explosion of Patent Assertion En-
tity Activity Has Aggravated the Costs 
of Abstract Software Claims.  
 A significant contributor to the rise in software 
patent litigation is the rise of patent assertion enti-
ties (PAEs).2 PAEs are firms that obtain patents 
 
 2 Patent assertion entities are sometimes called non-
practicing entities (NPEs) or patent trolls, though in the cited 
studies both refer to the same type of firm. 
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without intent to support or develop new products; 
instead, their business model is based on threatening 
costly litigation against practicing firms to extract 
settlements and licensing fees. Exec. Office of the 
President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation 1 
(2013), http://1.usa.gov/1oExPD1. The fact that PAEs 
do not actually use the patents they own outside of 
litigation effectively immunizes them from counter-
claiming and the defensive patent strategies dis-
cussed above. Id. at 4. In 2013 the White House 
released a report by the President’s Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, the National Economic Council, and 
the Office of Science & Technology Policy that con-
cluded on the basis of an extensive review of empiri-
cal studies that PAEs have had an overall negative 
impact on innovation and economic growth. Id at 2.3 
A recent study further suggests that the burden 
imposed by PAEs is disproportionately borne by small 
and medium sized firms who are more likely to be 
threatened with litigation by PAEs than large firms. 
 
 3 As a general matter PAEs follow three different strategic 
approaches when extracting rents: 1) a “lottery ticket” model 
where PAEs acquire broad, abstract patents in the hopes of 
obtaining outsized jury awards, 2) a “bottom-feeder” model 
where the PAEs actually avoid litigation, relying instead on the 
general high cost of patent litigation to obtain many small 
settlement agreements, or 3) building massive portfolios of 
patents to extort licensing fees from practicing firms. See Mark 
A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the 
Trolls, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 2126-28 (2013). The latter two 
strategies are much less likely to result in litigation than the 
lottery ticket model, so PAEs in such cases have little incentive 
to care about the quality of the patents they obtain. Id.  
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James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs 
from NPE Disputes, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 387, 398-99 
(2014) (reporting survey results that firms with less 
than $1 billion in annual revenues made up 90% of 
the sampled defendants in PAE lawsuits between 
2005-2011, and firms with less than $100 million in 
revenues made up 82% of all defendants, despite the 
fact that these small and medium sized firms only 
made up 44% of the overall survey sample).  
 PAEs are particularly relevant to the software 
industry because the bulk of PAE litigation involves 
software patent claims, which are particularly sus-
ceptible to abstraction problems. See James Bessen, 
Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and 
Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34(4) Regulation Mag. 
26, 29 (2011-2012) (reporting empirical study findings 
that 62% of patents litigated by PAEs between 1990 
and 2010 were “software patents” and 75% covered 
“computer and communications technology”); see also 
Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litiga-
tion Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate 
Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1309, 1347 (2013) (finding that roughly 80% of 
PAE lawsuits were brought to enforce claims with 
high-tech subject matter, 65% of which were software-
related claims); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, 
supra, at 22 (“Specifically, about 84 percent of [PAE] 
lawsuits from 2007 to 2011 involved software-related 
patents, while about 35 percent of operating company 
lawsuits did.”). PAE activity has increased so rapidly 
that in 2012 over half of all patent litigation cases 
could be attributed to PAEs. Exec. Office of the 
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President, supra, at 5. It is estimated that companies 
spent approximately $29 billion in 2011 dealing 
with these lawsuits. See Bessen & Meurer, The Direct 
Costs from NPE Disputes, supra, at 389. Apple, 
Samsung, HP, AT&T, Dell, Google, and Amazon.com 
were each sued by PAEs thirty or more times in 2013 
alone. Most Pursued Companies, PatentFreedom, 
http://bit.ly/M5egUQ (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).  
 
D. A Robust Application of § 101’s Abstract 
Idea Prohibition Restores the Balance 
that Alappat and State Street Disrupted. 
 This Court has stated repeatedly that the prohi-
bition on the patenting of abstract ideas is central to 
maintaining a proper balance in the patent system. 
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (“The Court has repeatedly 
emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not inhibit 
further discovery by improperly tying up the future 
use of laws of nature.”); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (“Phe-
nomena of nature, though just discovered, mental 
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not 
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.”). The Court has an opportunity 
to return patent law to the course it established in 
Benson, Flook, and Diehr, and further reaffirmed in 
Bilski and Mayo, by ensuring that § 101 provides a 
robust gatekeeping function to prohibit abstract 
software claims, including those whose only tether to 
physical reality is the computer itself or other similar 
general-purpose technological devices. Bilski, 130 
S. Ct. at 3230. 
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 Opponents to this Court’s position in Bilski and 
Mayo often claim that such holdings harm companies 
who have spent substantial amounts of money relying 
on the Federal Circuit’s holdings in Alappat and State 
Street. Such claims, however, are misguided. Given 
the evidence above, the large amount of money in-
vested in software patents has not led to more inno-
vation and sales growth; instead, they have been a 
part of the costly practice of building defensive patent 
portfolios to stave off litigation and have even come 
back to penalize software firms through greater PAE 
activity. A robust § 101 gatekeeper would mitigate 
these costs and free software firms’ capital from 
defensive patent stockpiling, making it available for 
productive and innovative R&D. This would further 
diminish the problem of patent thickets (discussed 
infra, §II(C)), ultimately increasing competition in 
the software industry and lowering cost of entry for 
innovative new startup companies. See Iain M. Cock-
burn & Megan J. MacGarvie, Entry and Patenting in 
the Software Industry, 57 Mgmt. Sci. 915, 926-29 
(2011).  
 
II. Section 101 Ensures the Patent System 
Operates as an Efficient Property Rights 
System. 
 In addition to skewing incentives and increasing 
socially wasteful spending, abstract software patents 
have undermined the patent system’s ability to 
function as an efficient property rights system be-
cause they (1) fail to define clear metes and bounds 
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for claims, (2) fail to provide effective public notice to 
avoid inadvertent infringement, and (3) contribute to 
troublesome patent thickets. 
 
A. Abstract Software Patents Fail to De-
fine Clear Metes and Bounds. 
 Unlike the physical landscape, the “patentscape” 
lacks unique and recognizable geological features to 
serve as common points of reference when describing 
the shape and size of an entitlement. The metes and 
bounds of a patent must, therefore, be interpreted by 
mapping the words in a claim to a range of technolo-
gies that are sufficiently analogous to the invention 
actually possessed by the inventor. An abstract claim, 
however, fails to provide these metes and bounds, 
not because it is too broad, but because it “claims 
technologies unknown to the inventor.” Bessen & 
Meurer, Patent Failure, supra, at 199. When an 
activity is described in an abstract manner – e.g. “the 
art of cutting ice by means of any power other than 
human power,” Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 727 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1840) – the limits of the claim cease to 
be cognizable as some range of extant technologies. 
Thus, although the ice-cutter’s patent was granted in 
the 1840s, there is no sensible mode of interpreting 
the boundaries of the claim that wouldn’t extend to 
ice-cutting by laser, robot, or genetically modified 
polar bear. As Justice Story argued, “No man can 
have a right to cut ice by all means or methods, or by 
all or any sort of apparatus, although he is not the 
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inventor of any or all of such means, methods, or 
apparatus.” Id. 
 Biological or chemical inventions will, at the very 
least, have a unique formula or compound molecule to 
serve as a point of reference. Software, on the other 
hand, may be capable only of functional, result-
oriented definitions – e.g., cutting ice – which are 
amenable to broad interpretations that transcend the 
actual technologies originally known to the inventor. 
See generally Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and 
the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 
905. Three examples, each litigated after Alappat, 
illustrate this interpretive ease. U.S. Patent No. 
4,528,643, commonly known as “the Freeny patent,” 
was granted for a vending machine that produced 
digital music tapes in stores, but the claim was 
cunningly drafted to be extremely comprehensive: a 
“system for reproducing information in material 
objects at a point of sale location.” Freeny filed his 
application well before the advent of personal com-
puters, e-commerce, and portable media players. 
Nonetheless, the company that came to hold the 
patent, E-DATA, alleged that purchasing, download-
ing, and transferring music from home computers 
onto media players or CD-ROMs were all within the 
patent’s scope. See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. 
Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
Similarly Wang Labs developed and patented an 
early operating system whose graphical user inter-
face displayed information in “frames.” Wang sued 
Netscape and America Online because these services 
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also displayed information inside of “frames,” a 
feature those programs share with almost all modern 
user interfaces. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 
197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Finally, in 2003, a 
PAE, Pinpoint, sued Amazon alleging that by recom-
mending books to users, Amazon had infringed a 
patent on “systems recommending TV programs to 
viewers based on past choices.” Pinpoint, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 995 (N.D. Ill. 
2005). 
 Such abstract claims as “displaying data in 
frames,” “recommending media based on past choic-
es,” “reproducing information in material objects at a 
point of sale,” or, as in the present case, using “a third 
party . . . to eliminate ‘counterparty’ or ‘settlement’ 
risk,” simply cannot be reliably construed to define a 
reasonable area of covered technology. See Wang, 197 
F.3d at 1379; Interactive Gift, 256 F.3d at 1323; Pin-
point, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 995; cf. CLS Bank Int’l v. 
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). A general counsel at a technology startup 
would be hard-pressed to describe any concrete 
bounds or permissible follow-on innovations to her 
fellow engineers in the face of such claims. Any 
software that resulted in a similar functional result 
could be construed as infringing, and any investment 
in the commercialization of those technologies could 
inevitably carry liabilities, risks, and costs whose 
magnitudes are impossible to predict in advance. 
Thus, the property system that ostensibly exists to 
assure investors that long-term rents are secure does 
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the very opposite, casting a pall of uncertainty over 
the viability of any commercial product that happens 
to be adjacent to a lurking abstract claim.  
 
B. Abstract Software Patents Fail to Pro-
vide Effective Public Notice. 
 Like metes and bounds, notice is also a concept 
the patent system borrows from traditional property 
law. Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra, at 206-
07. The concepts are linked in so much as uncertainty 
surrounding borders often makes it impossible for 
citizens to be on notice and effectively plan their 
behavior with regards to navigating those borders or 
developing the immediately adjacent properties. 
Under patent law a citizen may fail to have notice of 
a claim not merely because the borders of the claim 
were difficult to discern, but because the claim as a 
whole was never imagined to be the stuff of patents. 
Such is the plight of a technology firm’s general 
counsel who belatedly discovers that there are ab-
stract claims that actually apply to longstanding 
industry conventions, “the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63, 67 (1972). This was surely the rude awakening 
suffered by counsel at Netscape and America Online 
when their companies were accused of infringing a 
decade-old patent on “displaying information in 
frames,” despite the ubiquitous and unlicensed use of 
“frames” – windows or boxes – in software design. 
Wang, 197 F.3d at 1381. When sizable investments 
in product design, manufacture, and marketing are 
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made well before notice of a relevant abstract patent 
arrives, the inadvertently infringing manufacturer 
is in an extremely weak negotiating position. The 
patent holder can seek exorbitant royalties under 
credible threat of shutting down the manufacturer 
and rendering their prior efforts into fruitless sunk 
costs. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thick-
et: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Set-
ting, in 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119, 125 
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001). 
 Of course, one might argue that the job of a 
general counsel is to stay on notice, and so we may 
feel little pity for her failures. Perhaps she should 
have spent more time searching patent databases or 
monitoring the Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) 
weekly publications for relevant claims. However 
these searches have costs, and if these search costs 
are too onerous, productive activity will quickly cease. 
The costs of staying on notice in the software patent 
system are very large because of the staggering 
number of patents to discover and read. See Bessen & 
Meurer, Patent Failure, supra, at 213 (“David M. 
Martin has estimated that ‘if you’re selling online, at 
the most recent count there are 4,319 patents you 
could be violating. If you also planned to advertise, 
receive payments for or plan shipments of your goods, 
you would need to be concerned with approximately 
11,000.’ ”). Further, the cost in work hours of running 
the search can be extremely high. See id. (“One 
software executive estimates that checking clearance 
costs about $5,000 per patent.”); Christina Mulligan 
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& Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 289, 311-12 (2012) (“The 
more abstract an invention is, the more different 
parties are likely to use it for different purposes, and 
the more flexibility parties will have to describe it. All 
of these factors mean that more abstract patents will 
produce particularly high discovery costs.”). If 11,000 
patents need to be searched to engage in e-commerce 
while remaining on notice, and each patent will 
require a $5,000 investment in time and resources, 
then the careful software startup will be spending 
$55 million in capital before they can even begin to 
operate. Good news for lawyers, perhaps, though 
certainly not for in-house counsel, engineers, and 
others who depend on notice to ensure freedom to 
operate and innovate in new technologies.  
 Strategic PAE behavior also significantly in-
creases the costs of staying on notice. Normally, even 
if one could not identify patent risks from searching 
for relevant claim language, one might search the 
patent holdings of known competitors to steer clear of 
potential infringement. However, PAEs are by defini-
tion non-competing entities and often assign their 
patents to shell companies and subsidiaries making 
an essential component of notice – who owns what – 
difficult to ascertain. For example the PAE Intellec-
tual Ventures distributes its 25,000-50,000-deep 
patent portfolio among as many as 1,100 shell com-
panies. Avancept, A Study of: The Intellectual Ven-
tures Portfolio in the United States: Patents & 
Applications 6 (2d ed. 2010); see also Tom Ewing & 
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Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 Stan. 
Tech. L. Rev. 1, ¶¶ 21, 23, http://stanford.io/1jMBvPn. 
Similar behavior is widely reported across the PAE 
industry. See generally Colleen V. Chien, The Who 
Owns What Problem in Patent Law 3 (Santa Clara 
Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 03-12, 2012). 
Obscured ownership allows PAEs to maintain an 
element of surprise, revealing the patent only after 
substantial investments have been made in the 
commercialization of an infringing technology. Id. 
While abstract patent claims are not the sole source 
of these strategic behaviors, they match obscure 
ownership with ambiguous claims yielding more 
effective ammunition for a patent ambush. 
 The strategic filing of continuation claims on 
pending abstract patents also undermines the patent 
system’s notice function. Through continuation fil-
ings, patents can unfold gradually into an extended 
“family” of interrelated claims because patent appli-
cants perpetually retain the right to abandon an 
application and restart the process, as well as the 
right to seek additional broader claims arising from 
the same application. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. 
Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 
B.U. L. Rev. 63, 64 (2004). This allows patents to 
linger in the PTO, lying in wait for new companies 
and technologies to emerge as potential defendants. 
For example, patents accompanied by continuation 
filings average 4.16 years before issuance as com-
pared with solitary applications, which average 1.96 
years. Id. at 71. This behavior is quite prevalent: 23% 
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of all patent applications contain continuances and 
52% of all litigated patents had applications with 
continuances. Id. at 70. While the overall problem of 
continuations is beyond the scope of the question 
presented in this case, it is relevant to consider, given 
that the most litigated patents tend to be software 
patents owned by PAEs, see John R. Allison, Mark A. 
Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on 
Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Pa-
tents, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 29-31 (2009), and that 
these highly litigated patents take greatest ad-
vantage of continuations, see Michael Risch, Patent 
Troll Myths, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 457, 479 (2012) 
(finding an average of four continuations per patent 
in a sample of the most litigated patents). Thus, a 
robust § 101 gatekeeper would provide a considerable 
check on such practices and the notice problems they 
create with respect to abstract software continuation 
claims.  
 
C. Abstract Software Patents Contribute 
to Troublesome Patent Thickets.  
 When qualitative patent problems – boundary 
and notice – couple with the quantitative flood of 
abstract software patents, the result is a patent 
system so extensively partitioned and overlayed with 
exclusive rights that it stifles the very progress it is 
designed to promote. As a complicating factor, soft-
ware innovation regularly relies on assembling 
smaller complementary innovations into cumulative 
products. The Internet browsers challenged by the 
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Wang patent exhibited data in “frames” as one of 
many components in a larger and complex way of 
displaying web pages. When a single product can 
potentially infringe thousands of patents, the expense 
of negotiating a license for each claim can become 
cost-prohibitive. Being an essential part of a whole, 
any single rights holder may choose to hold-out for 
the full value of the cumulative invention. See Mark 
A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royal-
ty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991, 1994-98 (2007). Add 
to this the problem of abstraction, and the task of 
identifying all relevant rights and negotiating all 
appropriate licenses for each new version of every 
software product one sells becomes nearly impossible. 
 Scholars refer to the problem of overlapping 
rights as a patent thicket. See generally Bronwyn H. 
Hall et al., A Study of Patent Thickets, Report for the 
UK Intellectual Property Office (Oct. 2012), available 
at http://bit.ly/N6hAQt; Shapiro, supra. Patent thick-
ets occur in other complex technologies and a number 
of public and private policies can ameliorate their 
effects. However, patents on abstract ideas exacerbate 
the effects of patent thickets. Even the conscientious 
inventor determined to push through a software 
thicket is likely to miss at least some abstract pa-
tents, especially if all patentees must do to qualify 
under § 101 is tether the abstract idea to a general-
purpose computer or some other ubiquitous physical 
device. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. 
Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1421, 
1424 (2009) (finding that less than 3% of patent 
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litigation in the computer and software industries 
allege copying – i.e. 97% of cases involve allegations 
of innocent infringement). Unavoidable inadvertent 
infringement burdens innovators with unnecessary 
transaction costs, subverting the rule of law and the 
intent of the patent system. As Thomas Hobbes 
urged, “the use of laws is . . . as hedges are set, not to 
stop travellers, but to keep them in the way. . . . 
Unnecessary laws are not good laws, but traps for 
money.” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 252 (A. R. Waller 
ed. 1904).4 
 
III. Sections 102, 103, and 112 Are Not Replace-
ments for the Role of § 101. 
 Some commentators, including the Federal 
Circuit, have made a case for allowing “substantive 
  
 
 4 It is worth noting that more than efficiency is at stake 
when an overabundance of law fails to generate notice. Erratic 
enforcement and recondite doctrine prevent ordinary citizens 
from reliably planning their lives over the long term. The rule of 
law demands that citizens be treated as autonomous agents, 
capable of understanding rules and modifying their behavior 
voluntarily. Expediently coercing human behavior without first 
allowing for self-correction violates underlying principles of 
human dignity. Rational agents, citizens, are treated as cattle to 
be herded or horses to be broken. See generally Jeremy Waldron, 
How Law Protects Dignity, 71 Cambridge L.J. 200 (2012). A 
patent law that allows abstract claims destroys notice of essen-
tial legal commands; it treats society’s brightest as valuable 
victims for the traps set by overzealous patentees and sophisti-
cated, unscrupulous lawyers. 
29 
conditions of patentability” – § 102 (novelty), § 103 
(nonobviousness), and § 112 (written description, 
enablement, and best mode) – to resolve the issue of 
systematically overbroad abstract software patents. 
See, e.g., MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 
1250, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2012). However, properly con-
strued, § 101 serves a unique and distinct role from 
§§ 102, 103, and 112 and, in many cases, a more 
appropriate one for addressing the incentive, bound-
ary, notice, and thicket problems discussed above. 
 
A. Sections 102, 103, and 112 Are Unique-
ly Ill-Suited to Correct Notice Prob-
lems in Software Patents. 
 In the context of software patents, §§ 102, 103, 
and 112 suffer from severe systemic challenges, 
including being ill-suited to reduce notice uncertainty 
and resulting in excessive litigation costs. See Brian 
J. Love, Why Patentable Subject Matter Matters for 
Software, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Arguendo 1, 6-10 
(2012). For instance, in order to properly evaluate a 
claim under §§ 102 and 103, it must already have 
sufficiently clear metes and bounds by which to 
compare the scope of the claim against the prior art. 
Thus to function properly, §§ 102 and 103 rely on a 
robust § 101 to filter out abstract claims as a thresh-
old matter. 
 Even when the scope of the claims is manageable 
the PTO has historically found it challenging to 
search for prior art within the software arts under 
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§§ 102 and 103. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven 
Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office 
Outcomes, 94 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 817, 817-18 (2012). 
For one thing, PTO searches for prior art are gener-
ally limited to U.S. and foreign registered patent 
databases and commercial databases. Sean Tu, 
Luck/Unluck of the Draw: An Empirical Study of 
Examiner Allowance Rates, 2012 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 
10, ¶ 14, http://stanford.io/1h1YRjw. There is good 
reason to believe that much software prior art is not 
formally published anywhere, let alone in a patent 
application, meaning software prior art may never 
reveal itself in a search. See Robert P. Merges, 
As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: 
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent 
System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577, 589 
(1999); see also Iain M. Cockburn & Megan J. 
MacGarvie, Patents, Thickets and the Financing of 
Early-Stage Firms: Evidence from the Software In-
dustry, 18 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 729, 731-32 
(2009). Lack of publication is also due to the amount 
of software innovation done outside of established 
research communities by parties who do not ordinari-
ly make use of the patent system. See Julie E. Cohen 
& Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in 
the Software Industry, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2001). 
Innovations in unconventional fields are not neces-
sarily described in published journals, but rather, 
exist in actual business methods or the source code of 
products that are available to consumers. See id. at 
13; see also Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra, 
at 212-13 (“The general purpose nature of software 
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technology – again, because the technology is ab-
stract, similar techniques can be used in a wide range 
of applications – means that techniques known in one 
realm might be applied in another, yet the documen-
tary evidence that the Federal Circuit requires for a 
demonstration of obviousness might not be pub-
lished.”). 
 Even when software prior art has been pub-
lished, it is difficult to search for and locate. The PTO 
itself lacks the resources or expertise to keep up with 
new prior art. See Note, Estopping the Madness at the 
PTO: Improving Patent Administration Through 
Prosecution History Estoppel, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2164, 
2171 (2003). Where software has been patented, the 
PTO’s classification system has not historically been 
well-equipped to handle it. Cohen & Lemley, supra, at 
13. Software innovations are difficult to describe and 
there is no standardized language for describing them 
that is known to all interested parties. As a result, 
performing a search for the words “software” or 
“computer” could turn up thousands of existing 
patents but still be missing thousands more that are 
relevant. Evidence, thus, shows that the PTO routine-
ly issues software patents that overlook prior art. 
Merges, supra, at 589.  
 Section 112 also suffers from inadequacies as 
applied to software because the disclosure require-
ments for software inventions have proven exception-
ally lax and permit extremely broad claiming. This 
makes it almost impossible to invalidate a software 
patent claim on disclosure grounds, as general 
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functional descriptions are considered adequate. 
Bessen & Meurer, Patent Failure, supra, at 210. 
Software “inventors” can, therefore, obtain claims so 
broad that they effectively patent the problem, rather 
than the solution. See Lemley, supra, at 928-36 (dis-
cussing how software patents manage to skirt the 
limits imposed on functional claiming). 
 
B. Sections 102, 103, and 112 Generate 
Greater Litigation Costs than § 101. 
 The substantive conditions of patentability in 
§§ 102, 103, and 112 also have much greater litigation 
costs than § 101. While §§ 102 and 103 require the 
court to undertake claim construction as a predicate 
to conducting an invalidity analysis, § 101 generally 
does not require time-intensive claim construction to 
determine abstractness. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. 
Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(“[C]laim construction may not always be necessary 
for a § 101 analysis.”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun 
Life Assur. Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[W]e perceive no flaw in the notion 
that claim construction is not an inviolable prerequi-
site to a validity determination under § 101.”). In fact, 
this Court has never required claim construction as 
a predicate for any of its § 101 opinions. See, e.g., 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3222 (2010) (hold-
ing the patent to be ineligible on subject-matter 
grounds without claim construction). Moreover, an 
analysis under § 101 is less likely to involve factual 
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determinations, which would result in less discovery 
and a shorter timeframe for summary judgment.  
 District courts would also be well served by a 
strong, clear § 101. District courts have wide latitude 
in the order in which they decide issues, and provid-
ing clear guidance on deciding cases under § 101 
would allow lower courts to address this issue and 
decide cases more quickly. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice 
Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(“District courts are rightly entrusted with great 
discretion to control their dockets and the conduct of 
proceedings before them, including the order of issues 
presented during litigation.”). As it stands, the per-
ception that § 101 lacks clarity hinders the broad use 
of this mechanism in litigation. See MySpace, 672 
F.3d at 1260 (holding that courts may require liti-
gants to address a patent’s validity under §§ 102, 103, 
and 112 before reaching § 101, because doing so 
would avoid “the murky morass that is § 101 juris-
prudence”); Love, Why Patentable Subject Matter 
Matters for Software, supra, at 4. 
--------------------------------- i --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Section 101 serves an essential role in our patent 
system. It works to ensure the proper administration 
of property rights by balancing incentives for innova-
tion and providing adequate notice while maintaining 
public access to the ideas necessary for competition. 
This Court has long been familiar with the corrosive 
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effects of poorly designed intellectual property sys-
tems that “embaras[s] the honest pursuit of business 
with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and 
unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious ac-
countings for profits made in good faith.” Atl. Works v. 
Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883). This case presents 
an opportunity to reaffirm the innovator’s faith in a 
patent system that grants appropriate reward with-
out abstract encumbrance. Accordingly, this Court 
should affirm the invalidity of the patent claims at 
issue here and further hold that abstract ideas in the 
form of software are unpatentable and that mere 
computer implementation of those ideas does not 
create patentability. 
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